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I. INTRODUCTION
HE present topic has rather sober connotations-a leaner State
and leaner budgets in a globalized economy. But the subject also
opens the way to more encouraging perspectives, inviting us to
*Professor, Institute for Public Law, University of Bonn, Germany.
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consider how the tenets of economic wisdom can be channelled through
constitutional principles.
During the 50 years of its existence, the German Constitution has, on
the face of it, demonstrated remarkable solidity in light of global chal-
lenges in the economic sector. The framers of the German Basic Law
refrained from laying down a tight corset of economic, social, budgetary,
and monetary rules. Consequently, the flexibly tailored constitutional
framework not only fits the fully-fledged social State verging on the wel-
fare State, but also accommodates the phenomenon of the shrinking
State, which we have been experiencing since the mid-nineties.'
The famous formula of the "neutrality of the Basic Law in economic
policy," coined by the Federal Constitutional Court in the early fifties2 is
rather misleading. In fact, the German Constitution rules out all eco-
nomic regimes apart from the "social market economy" (soziale
Marktwirtschaft) whose basic tenets are now enshrined in the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") 3 and in the Charter
of Paris.4 A glance at the 15 European Union (EU) member states, how-
ever, demonstrates that the concept of a "social market economy" is a
house among many mansions. The constitutional underpinnings of the
soziale Marktwirtschaft lie on the one hand in the system of fundamental
freedoms (including free exercise of profession5 and protection of prop-
erty6) as bulwarks against state intervention, and on the other hand in the
principle of the "social state."'7
The text of the Basic Law only partially reflects constitutional changes.
The realization of European Economic and Monetary Union has made it
obvious that certain fundamental principles of the EC Treaty have be-
come part of Germany's constitutional order. A mixed national and Eu-
ropean "constitutional" system now governs monetary policy in
particular. 8 The amendment of Article 88 of the Basic Law, now espous-
ing the dominance of price stability as a constitutional directive, must be
read in light of the EC Treaty. In some ways, this constitutional amend-
ment, in conjunction with the new article on European integration (Arti-
cle 23 of the Basic Law) serves as a bridge connecting the Basic Law to
the fundamental treaty principles underlying the Economic and Mone-
tary Union. These fundamental treaty principles encompass an open
1. See MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, Constitutional Rights and the Diminishing State, CON-
STITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOCRACY-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 183-198
(Christian Starck ed,, 1999); WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998)
(examining the changing role of the state); WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997, THE
STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD, 19 (World Bank ed., 1997).
2. BverfGE 4, 7 (17) [Collection of Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court];
see also BverfGE 50, 290 (338).
3. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY [hereinafter "EC Treaty"].
4. 30 ILM 190 (1991).
5. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 12 (F.R.G.).
6. See GG art. 14 (F.R.G.).
7. See GG art. 20 § 1, art. 28 § 1, cl. 1 (F.R.G.).
8. See Matthias Herdegen, Art. 88, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (T. Maunz/G. Durig
eds, Looseleaf 1998), 919$ 1, 66.
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market economy with free competition (Article 4 [1] EC Treaty), stable
prices (Arts. 4 [3], 105 [1,1] EC Treaty), sound public finances, and mone-
tary conditions (Arts. 4 [3], 104 [1] EC Treaty) and a sustainable balance
of payment (Article 4 [3] EC Treaty). The most dramatic impact on eco-
nomic policy flows from the Treaty's rules on budgetary discipline and the
accompanying "Stability and Growth Pact," which form a quasi-constitu-
tional straightjacket unparalleled in legal history.9
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL PARAMETERS
A. ECONOMIC PARAMETERS
In rather broad terms the Basic Law subjects the Federation budgetary
policy and its components to the "overall economic equilibrium" (Article
109 [2]). Many understand this as a reference to the "magic quadrangle"
as defined in the Law on Stability (§ 1): stability of price level, high level
of employment, balanced trade, and steady and adequate economic
growth.
In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the amendment of Article 88 of
the Basic Law has shifted the balance considerably between these poten-
tially conflicting parameters. Thus, price stability now ranks as an "over-
riding goal" under the Constitution (Article 88, 2), in line with its
dominance under the (Arts. 4 [2], 105 [1,1] EC Treaty). This commitment
qualifies as a constitutional objective (Staatsziel).I0 The constitutional
entrenchment of monetary stability is a rather intriguing example of the
"enoblement" of an economic objective via European treaty making."
The rules on budgetary discipline in the EC Treaty12 and the constitu-
tional limitations on deficit-spending operate in close connection with
monetary stability.1 3 These rules also buttress the State's responsibility
vis-d-vis future generations.
Both the Community goal of a high employment level (Article 2 EC
Treaty) and the new provisions on employment that the Treaty of Am-
sterdam (Article 125 EC Treaty et seq.) introduced reflect an important
social concern. But they neither affect the commitment to price stability
as a dominant objective nor relax the clear obligation of budgetary disci-
pline. Similar considerations apply to the "Employment Pact" recently
9. See Matthias Herdegen, Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic
and Monetary Union: The Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom, 35 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 9-32 (1998); Hugo H. Hahn, The Stability Pact for European Monetary Union: Com-
pliance with Deficit Limit as a Constant Legal Duty, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 77-100
(1998).
10. Peter Badura, Das Staatsziel "Europaische Integration" im Grundgesetz, FEST-
SCHRIFT FOR HERBERT SCHAM3ECK 888, 904 (1994); Herdegen, supra note 8, at IT 69-73.
11. See Herdegen, supra note 8, at 16.
12. See EC TREATY arts. 104 (1, 2), 121 (1, 3); Herdegen, supra note 9, at 17.
13. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 115 § 1, 4.2 (F.R.G.) ("Revenue obtained by borrow-
ing shall not exceed the total of investment expenditures provided for in the budget; excep-
tions shall be permissible only to avert a disturbance of the overall economic
equilibrium.").
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adopted by the European Council during its June 1999 Cologne Summit.
This pact will operate only as a semantic counterpart to the legally bind-
ing commitment to monetary stability.
B. THE SOCIAL STATE
In their constitutional asceticism, the framers of the Basic Law ab-
stained from formulating social rights. The different approach taken in
many of the new federal States of East Germany did not influence later
amendments of the Basic Law. 14 Rather, the social responsibility of the
State expresses social responsibility in the principles of the "social State"
as a constitutional objective (Article 20 [1], 28 [1,1] of the Basic Law) and
the respect for human dignity (Article 1[1] of the Basic Law). The "social
State's" constitutional objective leaves ample room for legislative inter-
vention. But it remains to be seen, for example, whether a radical trans-
formation of our pension scheme would withstand constitutional scrutiny
in light of the guarantee of property. 15
C. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE PROTECTION
OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
Case law and constitutional doctrine have transformed the fundamen-
tal rights into a rather subtle instrument employed against excessive State
intervention. In particular, the freedom of profession (Article 12 [1] of
the Basic Law) and the property clause (article 14 of the Basic Law) con-
siderably limit the potential for a tightly regulated economic sector. In
the context of these and other freedoms, a strict scrutiny of proportional-
ity and the protection of legitimate expectations (Vertrauensschutz)16 call
for a finely-tuned balance between public purposes and individual inter-
ests. Moreover, the principle of equality (article 3[11 of the Basic Law)
requires not only rational differentiation, but also a sound empirical basis
for the burdening of specific groups. 17 Such scrutiny will also extend to
certain facets of recent legislation which purport to reduce contributions
to social insurance via higher taxes on the electricity and mineral oil con-
sumption ("Ecological Tax Reform").18
In this context, it is appropriate to emphasize the difference between
the general perception of the legislative process in Germany and the
American deference to congressional choices. Constitutional doctrine,
the political establishment itself, and citizens at large tend to perceive the
legislative process in light of possible defects and eradication of these de-
fects by constitutional review. Legislative choices thus appear inherently
14. Herdegen, supra note 1, at 195.
15. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 14 (F.R.G.).
16. BVerfGE 97, 67 (78); Thilo Rensmann, Reformdruck und Vertrauensschutz, 54
JURISTENZEITUNG 168-75 (1999).
17. See BVerfGE 88, 87 (96).
18. Law on the First Phase of Ecological Tax Reform, BGBI. I S. 378 (1999); see also
Government Draft, BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 14/40, at 1.
[Vol. 53
2000]GLOBAL ECONOMY/LEAN BUDGETS/PUBLIC NEEDS 547
susceptible to inconsistencies and subsequent falsification by empirical
analysis. From this perspective, constitutional review, despite all warn-
ings against excessive intervention by the Federal Constitutional Court, in
some way forms part of the legislative process. The recourse to funda-
mental rights against legislative discretion operates as a decisive factor in
this process. Naturally, constitutional doctrine, despite frequent criticism,
hardly operates as a truly restraining force against judicial activism-ex-
panded constitutional review enhances the political impact and influence
of constitutional lawyers.
1. The Economic Dimension
Fundamental rights severely curtail the State's power to ban certain
technologies, such as the operation of nuclear power plants.19 These
rights also protect against the inhibition of modern technologies, in par-
ticular genetic engineering, on the basis of mere speculative phantom
risks.20 Fundamental freedoms and the principle of equality restrain the
State's insatiable quest for higher taxes and similar revenues. In a recent
judgement, the Federal Constitutional Court activated the property
clause as a barrier to excessive taxation. The Court has developed the
famous and controversial formula of "semi-partition" (Halbteilung-
sgrundsatz) dealing with property taxes.21 Application of this formula to
other forms of revenue would put an end to Germany's leadership in high
income tax tariffs.
The Federal Finance Court recently emphasized that large discrepan-
cies between the tariffs for the taxation of private income and corporate
revenue are incompatible with the principle of equality.22 The Constitu-
tional Court has also established strict conditions for special levies that
affect only specific activities or individuals such as the tax-like levy on the
production of electricity used to finance an uncompetitive coal industry. 23
19. See Fritz Ossenbiihl, Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen eines Ausstiegs aus der fried-
lichen Nutzung der Kernenergie, 124 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 1-54 (1999).
20. See Matthias Herdegen, Biotechnology and Regulatory Risk Assessment, TRANSAT-
LANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION (G. Bermann/M. Herdegen/P. Lindseth eds., 1999).
21. BVerfGE 93, 121 (138):
Notwithstanding the legal guarantee with regard to the substance of assets,
revenue accruing from assets is also encompassed by the legal protection af-
forded to assets as a basis for individual liberty. According to Article 14 (2)
of the Basic Law, the use of property serves both private interests and the
public good. Therefore while revenue accruing from assets is subject to gen-
eral taxation, sufficient revenue for private use must be granted to the owner
of the assets. Hence, taxes on assets may only be levied in addition to other
taxes so long as the overall tax burden on the revenue remains close to a
semi-partition between private and public benefit, taking into account-by
means of generalizing-income, deductible expenses and other tax relief.
See also id. at 149 (Bockenftirde, J., dissenting).
22. See Bundesfinanzhof, 52 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1736 (1999).
23. See BVerfGE 91, 186 (203).
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2. Global Implications
In an era of global competition for capital, fundamental rights play an
important role in ensuring attractive conditions for investment.2 4 As ve-
hicles in opposition to excessive regulation, fundamental rights yield an
important spin-off in favor of free trade. This "global" dimension of fun-
damental rights becomes apparent when we look at current transatlantic
trade conflicts-the protectionist banana regime of the European Com-
munity raises constitutional issues with respect to the free exercise of pro-
fession and property.2 5 The cultural protectionism inherent in the quota
clauses of the European television directive collides with free expression
and related freedoms of communication under Article 5 of the Basic
Law.26 The insistence on transparent and empirically sound risk assess-
ment, voiced in the Hormone case by the Appellate Body in the WTO
dispute settlement procedure,2 7 seems like d~jd vu to the connoisseur of
the constitutional standards formulated in German case law.
In the conflicts engineered by Community legislation, however, the
standard of individual protection depends primarily on the unwritten fun-
damental rights recognized in Community law. The German Constitu-
tional Court has suspended its scrutiny of Community acts so long as they
do not display grave disrespect for the fundamental rights that the Basic
Law protects.2 8 Thus, the German Constitutional Court defers to scru-
tiny by the European Court of Justice. It is a matter of serious concern
that the European Court vests the Community legislator with excessive
discretion in its economic measures and falls short of providing clearly
justiciable patterns of control. The Court's case law often pays lip-service
to such fundamental rights as the freedom of profession and the protec-
tion of property.2 9
3. Rights to Public Payments and Access to Public Institutions
In the future, the State's receding role may find its limits in the distrib-
utive and participatory dimensions of fundamental rights. In our indus-
trial societies, the effective enjoyment of individual freedoms depends in
many ways on State assistance. The German Constitutional Court has
very cautiously recognized constitutional claims to benefit from public fa-
cilities, where the exercise of a fundamental right depends on such ac-
24. For the Court's role with respect to the German position in this global competi-
tion, see Matthias Herdegen, Standortsicherung durch Rechtsprechung, FESTSCHRIMr FOR
KARLHEINZ BOUJONo 869 (Carsten Thomas Ebenroth et al. eds., 1996).
25. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 48 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 950 (1995);
6 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 412 (1995).
26. See Matthias Herdegen, After the TV Judgment of the German Constitutional
Court: Decision-making within the EU Council and the German Lander, 32 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 1369 (1995).
27. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R&WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
28. See BVerfGE 73, 339 (387); BverfGE 89, 155 (175).
29. See MA-I-HIAS HERDEGEN, EUROPARECHT 158 (2d ed. 1999); Martin Nettesheim,
Grundrechtliche Pruifdichte durch den EuGH, 6 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFTr FOR WIRT-
SCHAF-ISRECHT 106 (1995).
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cess.30 But the Court has been careful to limit such claims to what the
individual can reasonably expect from society.31 This limitation defers to
Parliament's responsibility for competing social interests, for the overall
economic equilibrium, and for the budgetary discipline recently imposed
by the EC Treaty.
III. BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE
In the zoological garden of constitutional concepts, substantive and
substantial limitations of the power of the purse have only recently
emerged and are still rare animals. Attempts to devise material rules
aimed at sound public finances have rarely materialized on a constitu-
tional level. In 1798, Thomas Jefferson expressed his wish to remove the
borrowing power from the government. Years later, the then President
Jefferson fought for a loan of $15 million for the purchase of the Louisi-
ana Territories.32
A. RESTRAINTS ON THE POWER TO BORROW
The German Basic Law provides temporary restraints on the power to
borrow in Article 115 (1, 2).33 This clause establishes a constitutional bal-
ance between revenue obtained by borrowing and the investment ex-
penditures that foster the future production and growth potential. 34 The
future burdens resulting from borrowing must be balanced against the
future benefits resulting from investment. The escape provided in the
case of a disturbance of the economic equilibrium vests the parliamentary
legislator with broad discretion in balancing conflicting public interests.
The balancing process must, however, be plausible with regard to existing
economic and financial data.35
Many have challenged the rationale underlying the symmetry between
borrowing and investment on the ground that actual investments should
receive equal treatment to actual benefits resulting from investments
made in the past (and not as justification for future burdens flowing from
30. See BverfGE 33, 303 (329) (discussing access to university education).
31. See BVerfGE 33, 303 (333):
Although participatory rights are not per se limited to pre-existing public fa-
cilities, they are, however, only granted under the caveat of what is possible,
in the sense of what the individual may reasonably expect from society. This
is primarily within the judgment of the legislator who in his budgetary deci-
sions also has to take other public needs into account and must heed the
requirements of the overall economic equilibrium as expressly laid down in
Article 109 (2) of the Basic Law.
32. See Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Ac-
countants? A Look at State Experience, 12 J.L. & POL. 153 (1996).
33. See Badura, supra, note 10.
34. See Herbert Fischer-Menzhausen, Art. 115, 3 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR (Ingo
von Minch & Philipp Kunig eds., 1996), 13; Karl Heinrich Friauf, Staatskredit, 4
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, § 91, [ 20 (Josef
Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1990).
35. See BVerfGE 79, 311 (338).
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actual borrowing). 36 But in light of the capital actually received, borrow-
ing challenges inter-generation solidarity in terms of the interest rather
than the repayment of the credit. The budgetary burdens resulting from
interest payments harbor an inherent temptation for the State-inflation
(fueled by deficit spending) privileges the State as greatest debtor, unless
clauses protecting against monetary fluctuations flank its credits. 37
B. FISCAL DISCIPLINE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
The tight regime of fiscal discipline established by the Maastricht treaty
is far more sweeping than existing constitutional patterns. The strict rules
on public spending laid down in the EC Treaty 38 reflect the insight that
monetary stability cannot be achieved without rigid spending discipline.
This discipline is the most important component of solidarity within the
"compound" of the European Union.
The fundamental obligation is to avoid excessive public deficits (Article
104 [1] EC Treaty). The EC Treaty provides the contours for this obliga-
tion: Member States must keep their government debt within 60% of the
GDP and their government deficit within 3 percent of the GDP.39 For
the members of "Euroland," the provisions of the "Stability and Growth
Pact" contain a quasi-automatic control mechanism with a sanction spiral
leading to a deposit with macro-economic dimensions (up to 0.5 % of the
GDP).40 It remains to be seen to what extent the sanction scenario will
carry sufficient dissuasive force and whether, in a worst case scenario, the
Council of the European Union would be prepared to lash out against
tenacious failure in fiscal discipline. The "Stability and Growth Pact"
goes even beyond the "hard" obligation to avoid excessive deficits-EU
Member States participating in the European currency must pursue the
objective of a balanced budget or even of a budget surplus. 4'
It is hard to imagine such a stern regime of fiscal discipline resulting
from an internal constitutional process. Such rules are only conceivable
as the outcome of treaty-making where spending discipline is traded
against the transfer of monetary sovereignty. The treaty rules on govern-
ment spending can only be amended by common accord of all Member
States. Such an accord would imply constitutional reforms in some Mem-
ber States, including Germany. In constitutional terms, a stronger form
of legal and political entrenchment is unimaginable.
36. See Paul Kirchhof, Der Staat als Organisationsform politischer Herrschaft und rech-
tlicher Bindung, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 637, 646 (1999).
37. See Kirchhof, supra note 36, at 646.
38. EC TREATY art. 104.
39. See EC TREATY art. 104(1)(2) in conjunction with MAASTRICHT PROTOCOL art. 1
(No. 5) (discussing the Excessive Deficit Procedure).
40. See Commission Regulation 1467/97, art. 12(3), 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6 (discussing
expediting and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure); see also
Herdegen, supra note 9, at 30-31.
41. See Commission Regulation 1466/97, arts. 3(2, lit. a), 7 (2, lit. a) 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1
(discussing the strengthening and coordination of budgetary positions).
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IV. PRIVATIZATION
A. BACKGROUND
State withdrawal from certain functions in favor of private players has
several causes. First, fiscal restraints pressure the State into reducing its
presence in a number of economic and social sectors. The quest to qual-
ify for "Euroland" has induced Germany and other Member States of the
European Union to sell public enterprises (fully or in part), thus reducing
the public deficit and the government debt. For example, the federal gov-
ernment sold a considerable part of its stock in Deutsche Telekom in 1997.
In addition, fiscal restraints tempt the State to withdraw from the provi-
sion of unprofitable services and to cut social benefits. Leaner budgets
provide the impetus for a leaner State. 42 Moreover, the shrinking role of
the State broadens individual freedom in the economic sphere. Until re-
cently, state monopolies existing in the postal and telecommunication
sectors curtailed individual freedoms such as the free exercise of profes-
sion. Finally, the model of deregulated markets with open competition
calls for a change in the State's share in economic activities. EC competi-
tion law is one of the driving forces in this process. The EC Treaty (Arti-
cle 81) challenges State monopolies and public entities with exclusive
rights if they fail to meet modern demands of the public at large or of
specific sectors which, in turn, are fuelled by modern technological evolu-
tion.43 In recent years, EC legislation has pushed for the dismantling of
State monopolies and for the privatization of State functions, particularly
in telecommunications and postal services. 44 The quest for private invest-
ments and global competition for an attractive investment climate have
fueled the dismantling of State monopolies and the privatization of State
functions. In 1994, for example, the Federal legislature passed the Act on




1. Postal Services and Telecommunications
Until a 1994 constitutional amendment, an entity of the Federal admin-
istration, the German Postal Service, was responsible for the administra-
tion of postal services and telecommunications. 46 The 1994 constitutional
amendment 47 opened the post and telecommunication sector to private
42. See SACHVERSTANDIGENRAT "SCHLANKER STAAT," ABSCHLUSSBERICHT
(Bundesministerium des Inneren ed., 1997).
43. See A. Gardner, The Velvet Revolution: Art. 90 and the Triumph of the Free Market
in Europe's Regulated Sectors, 2 ECLR 78 [1995] .
44. See European Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, 1996 O.J. (C
281) 3, at § 34.
45. Act on Construction and Financing of Federal Motorways by Private Persons
(Gesetz uber den Bau und die Finanzierung von Bundesfernstrap3en durch Private), BGBI.
I S. 2243 (1997).
46. See GG art. 87 § 1, cl. 1 (F.R.G.).
47. See GG art. 87f § 2, cl. 1 (F.R.G.).
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undertakings. 48 The three branches of the German Postal Service were
transformed into public companies (Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Post
AG, and Deutsche Postbank AG) as envisaged by the constitutional
amendment in 1994.49 Private stockholders currently hold approximately
one quarter of the Deutsche Telekom AG capital share. The Federal Gov-
ernment, as exclusive owner, currently holds all the shares of the
Deutsche Post AG (which in turn has acquired the Deutsche Postbank
AG). In line with the amended constitution,50 the Deutsche Post AG
holds an exclusive license for postal services for a transitional period.5'
2. Broadcasting
Until the 1980s, the broadcasting sector in Germany was entirely re-
served to public entities. Relying on the scarcity of frequencies in the
electronic media at the time, the Federal Constitutional Court did not
extend the constitutional freedom of communication through audio-vis-
ual media52 to private entities. 53 In the wake of technological change,
private channels have been admitted to radio and television broadcasting.
Due to this technological evolution, the constitutional freedom of broad-
casting now covers the establishment and operation of private channels,
both under the Basic Law54 and under the European Convention on
Human Rights (article 10). 5 5
3. Construction and Operation of Roads
Under the terms of legislation passed in 1994,56 the federal government
may delegate to private persons its obligation to construct, maintain, op-
erate, and finance motorways. The private operator may levy tolls on
road users. Private construction and financing of motorways alleviates
the government's financial burdens and accelerates important construc-
tion projects (especially in eastern Germany).57
4. Public Order and Security
The maintenance of public safety and order remains a sector reserved
to the State. The State may not transfer basic police powers to private
48. See Herdegen, supra note 1, at 186.
49. See GG art. 143b § 1 (F.R.G.).
50. See GG art. 143b § 2, cl. 1 (F.R.G.).
51. See Act on Postal Services, BGBI. I S. 3294, § 51, cl. 1 (1997).
52. See GG art. 5 § 1, cl. 2 (F.R.G.).
53. See BVerfGE 12, 205 (261).
54. See BVerfGE 73, 118 (157); BVerfGE 95, 220 (234).
55. See European Court on Human Rights, Ser. A, vol. 276 (1994) - Informationsver-
ein Lentia.
56. See Act on Construction and Financing of Federal Motorways by Private Persons,
supra note 45.
57. See BUNDESTAGS-DRUCKSACHE 12/6884, at 12; cf. BERICHT DER ARBEITSGRUPPE
"PRIVATE FINANZIERUNG OFFENTLICHER STRUKTUREN" (Bundesministerium der
Finanzen ed., 1991).
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persons. 58 But the police may employ private agents to provide technical
assistance. 59
C. PUBLIC NEEDS AND A GUARANTEE OF MINIMUM STANDARDS
In certain areas covered by constitutional parameters, the State re-
mains responsible for meeting basic needs. This responsibility may either
prevent the State from fully phasing out specific sectors or oblige the
State to ensure that private players live up to minimum standards.
1. "Basic Service" in the Broadcasting Sector
The Federal Constitutional Court has held that the State remains re-
sponsible for offering a "basic service" (Grundversorgung) in the televi-
sion sector. This in turn is entrusted to public channels that meet the
basic needs of the public through information and cultural programs.
Both the continued existence and the development of public broadcasting
are thus constitutionally guaranteed. 60 According to the Constitutional
Court, a completely deregulated private electronic media market fi-
nanced exclusively by advertising could not represent the full spectrum of
opinions in society that the freedom of broadcasting requires. 61 Such
protection of public entities that compete with private players constitutes
a rather curious interpretation of individual freedoms.
2. Universal Services in the Postal and Telecommunications Sectors
The deregulation of the postal and telecommunications sectors leaves
the State to guarantee appropriate and adequate postal and telecommu-
nication services. 62 Federal legislation provides for compulsory services
(subject to compensation), should the market fail to adequately meet ba-
sic public needs.63
V. CONCLUSION
At the threshold of the new millennium, the German Basic Law pro-
vides a remarkably stable framework for Germany's role within both the
European Union and the international economic order. The winds of
global competition drive budgetary austerity and reduce State interven-
tion. The pressure of fiscal discipline finds minimal resistance in the con-
stitutional framework. Rather, the gradual withdrawal from high social
58. See Josef Isensee, Gemeinwohl und Staatsaufgaben im Verfassungsstaat, 3
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS, § 57 T 150 (J. Isensee & P. Kirchhof eds. 2d ed. 1996).
59. See 128 BAYERISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLATTER 412 (1997) (discussing the carrying
out of radio control of a speed limit Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgerichton); 127 BAYER-
ISCHE VERWALTUNGSBLATrER 90 (1998) (discussing detection of illegally parked cars
Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht).
60. See BVerfGE 74, 297 (327); BVerfGE 83, 238 (299).
61. See BVerfGE 97, 228 (256).
62. See GG art. 87f (F.R.G.).
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standards meets opposition rooted in legitimate societal claims and a
long-established political consensus. Like other EU member States, Ger-
many has subscribed to a monetary regime sheltered from short-term po-
litical temptations, thanks to the constitutionally entrenched
independence of the European Central Bank.64 The treaty rules on price
stability and fiscal discipline are an unprecedented attempt to subject ma-
jority rule to economic wisdom. This new regime has overcome the initial
birth pangs. It remains to be seen how this regime will withstand the
inevitable clashes with the social expectations that have been cherished
for many decades.
An axiomatic vision of the "proper" role of the State cannot be re-
solved by the current debate concerning the leaner State and its constitu-
tional underpinnings. 65 It is apt that almost 200 years ago, Wilhelm von
Humboldt's famous treatise did not inquire into the limits of the State,
but rather into the limits of the State's effectivity.66 It seems that neither
clinging to the fully-fledged social State nor driving towards the leaner
State eo ipso reflects what "truly" belongs to the State. Rather, as with
leaner or "fatter" budgets, these movements mirror the ebb and flow of
the tide to which both political science and constitutional doctrine must
constantly respond.
64. See EC TREATY art. 108; GG art. 88 § 2 (F.R.G.).
65. See Herdegen, supra note 1, at 191.
66. WILFIELM VON HUMBOLDT, IDEEN ZU EINEM VERSUCH, DIE GRANZEN DER WIRK-
SAMKEIT DES STAATS ZU IESTIMMEN (E. Cauer ed., 1851).
[Vol. 53
